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INTRODUCTION
Cinderella lived happily ever after,1 but what became of her
wicked stepmother, the Lady Drizella Trumaine?2 Imagine that this
classic tale was set in Louisiana and that in the years following
Cinderella’s storybook wedding, Cinderella’s father and Drizella
spent the remainder of their lives together. Though they were happy,
they were not particularly wealthy, and Cinderella’s father never
drafted a will. When Cinderella’s father died, Louisiana law granted
Drizella an interest in his share of the marital property in the form of
a usufruct.3 However, although Drizella was relieved to learn that
she would be permitted to use and enjoy her husband’s property in
the years following his death, she was dismayed when she learned
that Louisiana law also granted Cinderella an interest in the same
Copyright 2014, by KATHERINE H. DAMPF.
1. CHARLES PERRAULT, PERRAULT’S FAIRY TALES 56 (A. E. Johnson trans.,
2004).
2. CINDERELLA (Walt Disney Animation Studios 1950).
3. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2014) (providing that upon a spouse’s death,
the surviving spouse receives a usufruct over the deceased spouse’s one-half
interest in community property).
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property, effectively forcing Drizella to share her former husband’s
property with her ungrateful stepdaughter.4
One might imagine that this sharing of interests would not be the
most optimal arrangement, considering that the two did not have the
most natural and affectionate relationship.5 Drizella’s interest only
allows her the right to use the property and collect its fruits.6
Consequently, she may encounter financial difficulties if the
property does not generate income in the form of civil fruits—like
rents or dividends—because she is precluded from selling the
property to create liquid income. Given the tumultuous relationship
between Cinderella and her wicked stepmother, Cinderella would
feel no duty to come to Drizella’s aid. Indeed, Cinderella’s contempt
for Drizella might only be exacerbated by a legal scheme that
effectively deprives her of any right to her father’s estate while her
stepmother is still living and unmarried.7 Louisiana’s default
inheritance regime, designed both to approximate the will of the
decedent and provide for those left behind, serves no one in this
blended family.
A decedent who dies intestate—without a will—necessarily
does not express desires regarding the property left behind. Instead,
intestacy law imposes a “statutory will” on the decedent.8 Many
states have had to rethink traditional intestacy rules to address the
new social phenomenon of intestate succession involving a
stepparent and a decedent’s children,9 referred to in this Comment
4. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 7:5, in 3 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 438 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he naked ownership
of the share of the deceased spouse devolves to his descendants by intestacy and
the surviving spouse obtains a legal usufruct over that share”).
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.
6. As a usufructuary, Drizella would only be entitled to use and enjoy the
property as well as receive any civil or natural fruits from the property.
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 111. The right to dispose or otherwise
alienate the property resides with the naked owner alone—in this case, Cinderella.
See id. § 5:3, at 341. For more on the governing features of the usufruct, see infra
Part II.A.2.
7. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the legal scheme that arises by
operation of law terminates upon the earlier of death or remarriage of the surviving
spouse).
8. Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws
Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law
Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003). See also Susan N.
Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 1 (2000)
(describing a “statutory will” as one in which “the government, rather than the
individual, determines the dispositive terms”).
9. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Averill, Jr. & Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison of
Arkansas’s Current Law Concerning Succession, Wills, and Other Donative
Transfers with Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE
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as the “Cinderella Problem.”10 Louisiana Civil Code provisions
governing intestacy were made with “the family of the Civil
Code”11 in mind: a traditional, nuclear family that has become
increasingly rare in modern society.12 An artifact from a departed
era during which the traditional, nuclear family was bound by
lifelong affection, Louisiana’s “statutory will” is out of sync with
the modern family. Today, more than one-third of all Americans are
members of stepfamilies,13 18% of American adults have a living
stepparent,14 and most Americans die without wills.15 With a
divorce and remarriage rate higher than the national average,16

ROCK L. REV. 631, 635 (1995); Hargis, supra note 8, at 447–48; Andrew L.
Noble, Note, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania: A Proposal
for Reform, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 835 (2003).
10. The author is grateful to Professor Andrea B. Carroll for suggesting this
appellation.
11. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Changing Concept of Family and Its
Effect on Louisiana Succession Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2003) (quoting
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 15 (1981)).
12. Id. at 1164.
13. Noble, supra note 9, at 835.
14. PEW RESEARCH CTR., A PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES (2011) [hereinafter A
PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES], available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011
/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies [http://perma.cc/8MAG-NUBK] (archived Mar. 4,
2014).
15. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy
Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 172
(2006). Nearly 2.5 million Americans die each year, and many die without a will,
subjecting themselves to the laws of intestacy. Deborah L. Jacobs, The Real
Estate-Planning Crisis Isn’t About Taxes, FORBES (June 27, 2012, 6:00 PM),
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0716/investing-esate-tax-con
gress-rites-of-passage.html [http://perma.cc/UZH6-RL4E] (archived Mar. 4, 2014)
(explaining that a 2011 Associated Press survey showed 64% of baby boomers did
not have a will). See also Hargis, supra note 8, at 449–50 (demonstrating the vast
effects of intestacy law, given that nearly half of the U.S. population dies without a
will); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32
U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 649 (2002) (explaining that in spite of the many options
available regarding the distribution of their property, many people die intestate);
Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club—Examining the
Financial [In]security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
309, 350 (1999) (showing the importance of intestacy rules, given that the
majority of people die intestate); John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnutte,
Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to
Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61, 72 (1990) (citing empirical studies that
show more people die intestate than testate).
16. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A 50 STATE TOUR
(2009) [hereinafter MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A 50 STATE TOUR], available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/15/marriages-and-divorce-a-50-statetour [http://perma.cc/5454-KGBZ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
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Louisiana must do more to balance the competing interests of a
blended family in intestacy.
Because Louisiana law fails to adequately address the
combination of the stepfamily and intestacy, Louisiana law allows
for the dynamic between Cinderella and Drizella to exist to their
mutual detriment. Louisiana’s failure to address the needs of the
stepfamily in intestacy is made even more apparent by the fact that
other jurisdictions—both civil and common law—addressed
stepfamily inheritance long ago.17 Louisiana should follow in the
footsteps of its sister states and of France, its civilian predecessor, to
better address the Cinderella Problem, recalibrating intestacy laws
with today’s blended family in mind and preventing injustices like
those suffered by Cinderella and Drizella from befalling others.
Accordingly, this Comment considers the failure of Louisiana’s
current succession law in the context of the stepfamily. Part I of this
Comment discusses the theories underlying succession law,
highlighting the role of these theories in intestacy and arguing that
they require a careful balancing of the interests of the children and
the surviving spouse of the decedent. Part I also details the societal
evolution of the family from nuclear to blended, illustrating how the
implementation of the theories of succession has become even more
problematic. Next, Part II overviews the approach taken by
Louisiana to the stepfamily in intestacy, both in the past and in the
present, and demonstrates that Louisiana’s current approach is
inadequate in several critical respects. Part III then evaluates the
merits of approaches to the Cinderella Problem taken by France and
other jurisdictions. Finally, in order to solve the predicament facing
Cinderella and Drizella, Part IV proposes that a lump-sum-plus-afraction, rather than a usufruct, be allotted to Drizella. A revision of
Civil Code article 890 in the context of the stepfamily is long
overdue; Louisiana needs to do more for Cinderella and Drizella.
I. SUCCESSION THEORIES AND THE STEPFAMILY
The solution to the current Louisiana regime requires a sensitive
balancing of both Cinderella and Drizella’s interests. An
understanding of the competing interests at play requires a working
knowledge of the theories underlying succession law generally. The
description of the prevalent succession theories is followed by a
Section discussing the blended family, providing a synopsis of the
blended family in America today, and illustrating the complex
interests involved when the succession theories and the stepfamily
are simultaneously considered.
17. See infra Part III.
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A. The Theories Underlying Succession Law
Succession law governs the distribution of a decedent’s property
upon death.18 A succession is either testate, occurring when a
decedent dies with a valid will, or intestate, occurring when a
decedent dies without a will.19 Many theories underlie intestacy
provisions;20 however, two theories are more commonly applied: the
natural duty theory and the presumed will theory.21
1. The Natural Duty Theory
The natural duty theory relies upon societal views about what a
decedent “ought” to do.22 This approach to intestacy does not
necessarily reflect how the decedent would want property
distributed upon death but rather how property should be distributed
upon death in order to further the goals of society.23 Academics
argue that a decedent’s natural duty to dependent family members is
germane to intestacy, given that an underlying concern in any
succession scheme is “justice and fairness” for the decedent’s
successors.24

18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 871 (2014).
19. DENNIS R. HOWER & PETER KAHN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATE
ADMINISTRATION 6 (7th ed. 2012).
20. Scalise, supra note 15, at 176 n.19. Intestacy statutes vary widely from
state to state. Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in
the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 322 (1978).
21. See Scalise, supra note 15, at 173. These two theories were considered as
“primary considerations” at the turn of the 20th century and even as far back as
Roman times. See id. at 174. Professor Scalise explains that these are not the only
theories underlying succession law. Id. at 176 n.19. Though the presumed will and
natural duty theories are the most influential in the United States, he explains,
others do exist. Id. For instance, Roman succession law was premised on the goal
of the continuance of families into the next generation after the head of the family
died. Id. Another goal of American succession law is the recognition and support
furthering the family unit. This is seen throughout intestacy statutes in various
states. In every intestate succession scheme, the decedent’s family is the recipient
of the decedent’s property. Hargis, supra note 8, at 452.
22. Scalise, supra note 15, at 173–75.
23. See KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 2:1,
in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 16 (2d ed. 2009).
24. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy
Provisions for Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 947
(1995).
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a. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Children
Historically, the natural duty theory supported the devolution of
a decedent’s property to relatives who needed it most—minor
children.25 Academics argued that children were entitled to their
intestate inheritance based on their parents’ natural duty to “preserve
what they had begotten.”26 Without their parents’ assistance, most
minor children would be inadequately supported, thus relying on the
State for support.27
b. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Surviving Spouse
However, minor children may not be the only relatives in need
of financial assistance upon the death of the decedent. The surviving
spouse may also require support.28 If beyond the age to rejoin the
workforce, the surviving spouse could be economically destitute.29
Government assistance through social security benefits can make a
difference, but alone it is not enough, as these payments are barely
above the poverty level.30 Together, these facts suggest that the
surviving spouse could be in need of assistance. Therefore, in
compliance with the natural duty theory, default intestacy provisions
should consider the potentially destabilized position of the surviving
spouse.
Thus, under the natural duty theory, a duty of support is
warranted to both the surviving spouse and the decedent’s children
upon the decedent’s death. Neither should inherit to the complete
detriment of the other; instead, striking a balance between the
interests of the surviving spouse and the decedent’s children should
be the ultimate goal.

25. 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 413 (Christopher Berry
Gray ed., 1999).
26. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 207 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)).
27. See Steve Hargreaves, Deadbeat Parents Cost Taxpayers $53 Billion,
CNNMONEY (Nov. 5, 2012, 5:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/05/news
/economy/unpaid-child-support/index.html [http://perma.cc/DV74-KPA3] (archived
Mar. 4, 2014) (explaining that in 2009, the federal government paid out $53 billion
for public assistance because parents neglected to financially support their children).
28. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59
MO. L. REV. 21, 33 (1994).
29. Only 13% of surviving spouses ages 65 and older report income from
earnings. Id. at 31. For more on the economic position of the surviving spouse, see
id. at 38–40 (detailing the predicament a surviving spouse could be in when facing
the real-world, modern costs of growing old).
30. Id. at 32.
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2. The Presumed Will Theory
The role of intestacy with respect to a decedent’s children and
surviving spouse becomes more complex when one considers the
presumed will theory of intestate succession. Unlike the natural duty
theory, the presumed will theory focuses on the supposed desires of
the decedent in the distribution of the estate.31 According to this
theory, state legislatures draft statutes based on how the average
person would dispose of property upon death.32 Given the difficulty
in determining a person’s presumed desires without a will,
policymakers look to the distribution patterns of testate decedents
for insight.33 Studies have shown that most people of modest means,
even people with children from a prior marriage, leave their entire
estates to their surviving spouses.34
When the presumed will and natural duty theories are viewed in
tandem, as they should be in the formulation of any intestacy
regime, it is apparent that while the needs of both the spouse and the
children should be taken into account, the State ought to ensure that
a significant portion of the decedent’s property devolves to the
surviving spouse in the absence of a will.
B. The Complications of the Stepfamily
A change in the construct of the family over the last several
decades has rendered the balancing of a decedent’s natural duty and
presumed will in intestate succession even more problematic. Given
31. Scalise, supra note 15, at 173. Around since the 17th century, the
presumed will theory is not a modern approach to the fashioning of intestacy
provisions. Id. at 174. In the 19th century, French Civil Code redactors stated,
“The legislation on successions is the presumed testament of every person who
dies without having validly expressed a different will.” Id. Conforming with this
theory, the redactors created legislation that “dictate[d] as the deceased himself
would have dictated at the last instant of his life, if he had been able and willing to
express himself.” Id.
32. Daniel H. O’Connell & Richard W. Effland, Intestate Succession and
Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate
Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 209 (1972). Given that it is impossible to create a
statute that comports with every decedent’s presumed will in every situation, it is
impossible to carry out the presumed will of the decedent in each specific instance.
Gary, supra note 14, at 646.
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.2 (1999) (listing empirical studies); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 282 (1977) (discussing the desires of the average
American spouse in determining how to distribute his or her property).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.2 (1999); see also GLENDON, supra note 33, at 282.
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that the United States has developed one of the highest divorce and
remarriage rates in the Western world,35 gone are the days of the
“Cleaver” family norm.36 With more than four in ten Americans
reporting they have at least one step-relative,37 the American family
is not what it used to be.38
1. The Blended Family
Today, divorce and remarriage are common experiences in the
lives of Americans,39 causing a dramatic change in the structure of
the American family.40 The traditional nuclear family consisting of
35. Belinda Luscombe, Who Needs Marriage? A Changing Institution, TIME
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,20321161,00.html [http://perma.cc/78JR-JEZU] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). See also Pat
Wingert, Americans Have Highest Divorce, Remarriage Rate, NEWSWEEK (Aug.
14, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/14/ameri
cans-marry-too-much.html [http://perma.cc/8M6S-JAJZ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014)
(showing how the American divorce rate is higher than other countries’ divorce
rates).
36. “Leave it To Beaver” was a mid-century American television show that
depicted the “‘typical’ American family consisting of a mother, father and two
kids” and was “a favorite stereotype of the nuclear family.” Gary, supra note 8, at
4 n.14 (explaining that the “Cleaver family” is no longer the norm in America).
37. A PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES, supra note 14. See also Engel, supra note
15, at 343 (explaining that children today are more likely to live with stepparents
and half-siblings than biological parents and siblings); Noble, supra note 9, at 835
(citing data showing that one-third of all Americans are members of stepfamilies).
38. Noble, supra note 9, at 835. See also Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting
Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the
Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1493 (2000) (explaining
that the structure of American families has changed dramatically in recent decades);
PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 16
(2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends
-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7EG-J332] (archived Mar. 4, 2014)
(demonstrating that although America had a higher marriage rate than the European
Union, America’s divorce rate was higher than that of the European Union).
39. Engel, supra note 15, at 319. In 1997, 50% of all marriages were likely to
end in divorce. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1164. In nearly one-half of all marriages
today, at least one of the spouses has been married once before. Id. For a detailed
discussion of changes in family throughout the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, see
id. See also 5 EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL,
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 7 (Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007) (explaining that this “redefinition” of the
family has been taking place as a result of social developments).
40. This change in the family construct can be attributed to easier divorce
laws and the now commonplace notion of “serial polygamy.” Lorio, supra note
11, at 1177−78. Professor Lorio coined the term “serial polygamy” from Harry D.
Krause and David D. Meyer’s What Family for the 21st Century?. See Harry D.
Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st Century?, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 101, 103 (2002) (“[W]ithout calling it by that name, modern divorce law and
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the breadwinning husband, the stay-at-home wife, and their two
children exists today but in much lower numbers than in the past.41
Moreover, most divorced people remarry, creating blended
stepfamilies.42 With the modern divorce rate nearly twice the rate of
that of the 1950s,43 it is estimated that there are more stepfamilies
than nuclear families in the United States today.44 U.S. Census
Bureau data shows that in 2004, 12% of women and 13% of men
had married twice.45 Three percent of both men and women had
been married three or more times.46
Additionally, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau,
most spouses that remarry already have children.47 Remarriages are
practice have resulted in a sort of legitimization of polygamy by way of
legalizing multiple, successive marriages or relationships of persons who have
continuing legal, financial and social ties to prior partners and children.”).
Additionally, with the advent of “no-fault divorce,” the decision to divorce
became unilateral, and mutual consent to divorce was no longer necessary.
David Milstead, As Two-Income Family Model Matures, Divorce Rate Falls,
CNBC (May 7, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46797203/As_Two
_Income_Family_Model_Matures_Divorce_Rate_Falls [http://perma.cc/EZK66H2G] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). Also, economic changes facilitated the ease of
divorce. Id. With wives transitioning from stay-at-home mothers to career
women in the 1960s and 1970s, women’s new income made it possible for them
to separate from their husbands more easily. Id.
41. Holob, supra note 38, at 1493. See also E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive
Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1063, 1094 (1999) (explaining “traditional families” have become
increasingly less typical in recent years).
42. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1164.
43. KRISTEN CELLELO, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES: MAKING MARRIAGE WORK 4 (2009).
44. Janice Van Dyck, In Praise of Stepfamilies, BLOG (Aug. 11, 2011, 1:19
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-van-dyck/in-praise-of-stepfamilies_b
_920688\.html [http://perma.cc/5VB3-V2HB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
45. Press Release, The U.S. Census Bureau, Most People Make Only One
Trip Down the Aisle, But First Marriages Shorter (Sept. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/most-people-make-only-one-trip-do
wn-the-aisle-but-first-marriages-shorter-census-bureau-reports-58151357.html
[http://perma.cc/5Z3D-HAFB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
46. Id. The remarriage rate after divorce tends to be higher for men than for
women, with more than half of the men who have ever been divorced currently
remarried. Id. This number is based on adults ages 25 and older. Id.
47. Rose M. Kreider, United States Census Bureau, Presentation at the
American Sociological Association annual meeting: Remarriage in the United States
(Aug. 10–14, 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/marriage
/data/sipp/us-remarriage-poster.pdf [http://perma.cc/E2X4-6T26] (archived Mar. 4,
2014). Additionally, researchers predict that more than half of all women in the
United States will become stepmothers upon remarriage. Wednesday Martin, Let’s
Stop Expecting Sandra Bullock to Be a Stepmartyr, HUFFINGTON POST ENT. (Mar.
24, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wednesday-martin/lets-stop-
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often “fragile” and “unstable,”48 characteristics that have been
shown to negatively affect the children involved.49 With a divorce
and remarriage rate higher than the national average, Louisiana
should be particularly attentive to the increased complications of the
stepfamily in intestacy.50
2. The Complications of the Blended Family Exacerbated in
Intestate Succession
Certain factors exacerbate the complications experienced by
stepfamilies in intestate successions. Such factors include unnatural
ties, passive neglect, and conflicting loyalties. An analysis of these
factors shows that Louisiana’s current law, article 890, is wholly
inadequate when dealing with the stepfamily in intestacy.
a. Unnatural Ties
Stepparents face a myriad of complexities in their relationships
with their new family members, not the least of which is learning
how to love another person’s child.51 Unlike the biological
relationship between a parent and child, the relationship between a
stepparent and stepchild is fixed through remarriage.52 Upon
remarriage, spouses step into an awkward “family dance,” requiring
each new spouse to determine the dynamic of his or her relationship
with his or her spouse, the spouse’s children, and often the
children’s other biological parent.53 Additionally, the stepparent
could face the primitive emotion of suspicion of the child.54 Not

expecting-sandr_b_510813.html [http://perma.cc/6Y55-PCEN] (archived Mar. 4,
2014). See also David G. Schramm & Francesca Adler-Baeder, Marital Quality for
Men and Women in Stepfamilies: Examining the Role of Economic Pressure,
Common Stressors and Stepfamily-Specific Stressors, 33 J. FAM. ISSUES 1373, 1374
(2012) (estimating that 65% of those who remarry will bring a child from a previous
relationship, thus creating a stepfamily).
48. Lorio, supra note 11 at 1178.
49. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What’s Become of Disinherison, and the
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637, 661−62
(2000).
50. See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A 50 STATE TOUR, supra note 16.
51. Patricia Hart, On Becoming a Good Enough Stepmother, 37 CLINICAL
SOC. WORK J. 128, 129 (2009).
52. Spaht, supra note 49, at 666.
53. Hart, supra note 51, at 129.
54. Id.
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surprisingly, only 20% of stepchildren report to have a good
relationship with their stepparents.55
According to experts, the problems plaguing Cinderella and
Drizella may not be limited to the world of fairy tales but rather are
rooted in fact. In particular, social scientists “agree that families with
a full-time stepmother do worse than families with a stepfather.”56
This may be a result of the stepmother inherently being more
difficult or perhaps because tensions between the stepmother and the
biological mother cause more complications.57 Presumably, the
unnatural ties between step-relatives are likely to persist after the
decedent’s passing.58
b. Uncomfortable Conversations and Passive Neglect
In addition to unnatural ties, stepfamilies face other
complications.59 According to one academic, “Stepfamilies face
complex emotional issues as they sort out and create family
relationships.”60 Given these complex and new interaction patterns,
stepfamilies avoid necessary discussions. Conversations about
money are a source of discourse in first marriages,61 but given the
layer of complex emotional issues that is added to the blended
family, these conversations only become more complicated in the
stepfamily context.62 For similar reasons, stepfamilies avoid
discussion of inheritance because “stating inheritance rights in a
55. Joanne Richard, The Challenges of Stepkids, LIFEWISE PARENTING (June
9, 2011, 6:20 AM), http://lifewise.canoe.ca/Parenting/2011/05/04/18103011.html
[http://perma.cc/3T2U-SEHB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). See also infra notes 67−72
and accompanying text (explaining the “conflicting loyalties” that may exist
within the blended family).
56. Spaht, supra note 49, at 664. Further, statistics show that a wife will likely
outlive her husband, making it statistically more likely that the surviving spouse
will be female, leading to the Cinderella Problem. See Kreider, supra note 48.
57. Spaht, supra note 49, at 665.
58. In cases where a decedent dies with a will, one-third of all will contests
relate to issues of divorce and remarriage. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1181. Studies
show that these contests are brought by disgruntled natural children and
stepchildren of the deceased. Id.
59. See generally Engel, supra note 15.
60. Gary, supra note 15, at 650.
61. See Alex Veiga, Divorce Causes: How To Avoid Money Problems In Your
Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/05/16/avoiding-marriages-no-1-p_n_1521232.html [http://perma.cc
/6GNG-A6A5] (archived Mar. 4, 2014) (describing “[m]oney problems” as the
number one reason marriages end in divorce).
62. See Engel, supra note 15, at 317 (explaining that the topic of money in a
remarriage has been listed as one of the largest sources of difficulty in
remarriages).
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legal document may raise issues that stepparents and their spouses
would rather avoid.”63 Scholars have coined this phenomenon as
“passive neglect.”64
Evading this discussion, remarried spouses often fail to make a
will.65 Avoiding uncomfortable inheritance discussions, however,
can lead to a bombshell for the intestate successor’s blended family
because intestacy statutes are patterned after the traditional family.66
c. Conflicting Loyalties
When the decedent is the spouse with children from a prior
marriage, the surviving spouse may face “conflicting loyalties.”67
When spouses remarry at a later age, their adult children likely feel
entitled to their share of inheritance from their natural parent.68
These conflicting loyalties can cause “steam to rise” when a
decedent dies intestate after multiple spouses, children, and
stepchildren are thrown into the mix.69
Further, these issues are not rare.70 Pew Research data confirms
the complications resulting from the unnatural ties between
stepparents and stepchildren.71 According to a recent study, only
62% of stepparents say they would feel obligated to their grown
stepchildren, compared with 78% of people who would feel
obligated to their grown natural children.72 This variance between
the views of stepparents and natural parents regarding their duty to
children is intensified in intestacy.
Thus, the complications of the blended family impact intestacy
policy in several fundamental ways. The increased prevalence of
stepfamilies requires a legislative response to the complications that
result. Because most people who are remarried fail to make a will,73
state legislatures must enact intestacy legislation that accounts for
63. Gary, supra note 15, at 650.
64. Engel, supra note 15, at 343.
65. Surveys indicate that few people choose to have intestacy statutes govern
the distribution of property upon their death. Gary, supra note 15, at 650.
66. Engel, supra note 15, at 343.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.2 (1999).
68. Jane Bryant Quinn, Financial Planning: Wills and Other Ways,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 12, 2007, 10:11 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek
/2007/10/12/financial-planning-wills-and-other-ways.html [http://perma.cc/9S2558UF] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
69. Id.
70. See A PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES, supra note 14.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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the blended family’s unique dynamic. Additionally, given the
unnatural ties and conflicting loyalties that plague the stepfamily
relationship, state legislatures ought to create laws that minimize the
ways in which the intestacy regime might exacerbate potential
conflicts within the stepfamily.
II. LOUISIANA’S DEFICIENT TREATMENT OF THE STEPFAMILY IN
INTESTACY
Viewed in tandem, the natural duty and presumed will theories
suggest that both the children and the surviving spouse should be
provided for upon a decedent’s death, with an emphasis on the
preservation of the surviving spouse. The complications posed by
the stepfamily indicate that an ideal intestacy regime would
apportion the property in such a way that litigation and family
discord are minimized, both in terms of the amount of property that
each party receives and the extent to which the division of property
requires the parties to interact with one another. In light of these
considerations, however, Louisiana’s treatment of the stepfamily in
intestacy fails in several critical respects.
A. The 890 Usufruct
The modern rights of the surviving spouse in intestacy are the
byproduct of an evolution of the surviving spouse’s historical
position in Louisiana intestacy law.74 A review of the evolution of
the mechanisms at play in intestacy law illustrates the shortfalls of
the current approach and the need for further legislative action for
the blended family in intestacy.
1. The Historical Approach
The intestate rights of a surviving spouse were historically much
more limited than they are today.75 Until 1870, upon a decedent’s
intestate death, the community property acquired during a marriage
was given to the decedent’s legal heirs, not the surviving spouse.76
With the creation of article 915 of the Civil Code of 1870, the
surviving spouse received a usufruct over the decedent’s half of the
74. See Lorio, supra note 11, at 1161−66 (giving an overview of the evolution
of the position of the surviving spouse under Louisiana law).
75. A widow was not an intestate heir except in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, or collaterals. Id. at 1162 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 45 (1808)). The
widow was, however, protected by the provisions of community property law and
the marital portion. Id. at 1162–63 (citing LA. CIV. CODE arts. 55, 63 (1808)).
76. See LORIO, supra note 23, § 2:15, at 40.
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community property for life.77 Still today, a surviving spouse is
granted a spousal usufruct over the decedent’s share of community
property.78 The usufruct enables the surviving spouse to take a
limited interest in the decedent’s share, rather than outright
ownership.79 The creation of the spousal usufruct in intestacy thus
represents the beginning of an improvement of the surviving
spouse’s position.80
The introduction of the spousal usufruct was seen primarily as a
balance between the needs and interests of the surviving spouse and
those of the decedent’s children, who were all classified as forced
heirs at the time.81 This balance of interests was initially
accomplished because the provision was drafted with a certain type
of family in mind—one where marriages were for life and children
were born of that marriage.82 The balance was also achieved
because the spousal usufruct affected only the decedent’s share of
community property and therefore did not at all affect the decedent’s
children’s “unfettered use and disposal” of their deceased parent’s
separate property.83 Additionally, the termination of the usufruct
upon the remarriage of the surviving spouse protected the
decedent’s children from the influence of the surviving spouse’s
77. Id. § 2:15, at 41.
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2014).
79. See id. art. 477.
80. The spousal usufruct was introduced in Louisiana in Act 152 of 1844. The
Act provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the State of Louisiana, in General Assembly convened, That in all cases
hereafter, when either husband or wife shall die, leaving no ascendants or
descendants, and without having disposed by last will and testament, of
his or her share in the community property, such share shall be held by
the survivor in usufruct during his or her natural life.
Section 2. Be it further enacted, &c. That in all cases when the
predeceased husband or wife shall left issue of the marriage with the
survivor, and shall not have disposed by last will and testament, of his or
her share in the community property, the survivor shall hold in usufruct
during his or her natural life, so much of the share of the deceased in said
community property as may be inherited by such issue: Provided,
however, that such usufruct shall cease whenever the survivor shall enter
into a second marriage.
Act No. 152, 1844 La. Acts 99. Only implemented in the Code of 1870, the
usufruct of the surviving spouse was not included in the Civil Codes of 1808 or
1825. LORIO, supra note 23, § 2:15, at 40.
81. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1165. See also A. N. Yiannopoulos, Of Legal
Usufruct, The Surviving Spouse, and Article 890 of the Louisiana Civil Code:
Heyday for Estate Planning, 49 LA. L. REV. 803, 803 (1989).
82. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1163.
83. Id. at 1165.
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new partner.84 Overall, the decedent’s children and the surviving
spouse of the “family of the Civil Code” were well provided for.
Many Louisianans were content with the intestacy scheme in place
and chose not to make a will, opting instead for the default
provisions to control.85
Importantly, the Cinderella Problem was entirely avoided when
the spousal usufruct was first introduced. The eligible property to be
held in usufruct was limited to the property that was inherited by a
child of the marriage between the decedent and the surviving
spouse.86 A stepparent was therefore never afforded a right of
usufruct over a stepchild’s inheritance.87 This did not mean,
however, that the law effectively met the needs of the spouse and
children in a blended family—although the children retained their
right to inherit, the surviving spouse was effectively denied rights to
the estate as a result of the surviving spouse’s relationship to them.
In 1981, to rectify the perceived injustice that befell a surviving
spouse who was also a stepparent of the decedent’s children, the
Louisiana Legislature reformed the law to extend the spousal
usufruct to all spouses, regardless of the existence of a blended
family.88 Although the law as revised significantly advanced the
rights of the surviving spouse, the Cinderella Problem emerged, and
the potential for new conflicts was born.89 The myopic legislation
merely extended rights—formulated for the traditional nuclear
family—to stepparents and did nothing to address the complications
of the stepfamily. Thirty years after taking an initial step in the right
direction, Louisiana needs to modernize the law applicable to the
stepfamily in intestacy.
2. The 890 Usufruct Today
Today, the spousal usufruct is found in Civil Code article 890.90
The characterization of the spouse’s right as one in usufruct rather
than full ownership imposes a limitation on the power of the spouse
with respect to the property and brings with it significant
complications. An overview of the features governing the usufruct is
84. Id.
85. Yiannopoulos, supra note 81, at 804.
86. See, e.g., Succession of Emonot, 33 So. 368 (La. 1902). See also
Succession of Williams, 127 So. 615 (La. 1930). Today, “issue of the marriage”
has been held to mean any descendant in the direct descending line, including
grandchildren and adopted children. See LORIO, supra note 23, § 2:16, at 54.
87. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1165.
88. Act No. 911 § 1, 1981 La. Acts 2050.
89. Id.
90. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2014).
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required to illustrate the usufruct’s grave inadequacies when
implemented in the context of intestacy and the blended family.
First, a usufruct is a real right of limited duration.91 The person
who holds the usufruct, the “usufructuary,” receives the right to use
and enjoy the property.92 The person who holds the right of
disposition is known as the “naked owner.”93 The usufructuary is
responsible for what are considered “ordinary repairs,” while the
naked owner is responsible for “extraordinary repairs.”94
The timing of the termination of the right varies with the type of
usufruct at issue, and the law provides that the 890 usufruct
terminates upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse.95
At termination of the 890 usufruct, the naked owners—the
decedent’s children—receive the usufructuary’s rights of use and
enjoyment, in addition to their own rights of abusus, and thus enjoy
full ownership.96 Importantly, the surviving spouse receives a
limited right that cannot be passed on to his or her own successors.97
The precise obligations of the usufructuary depend upon whether
the property subject to the usufruct is classified as consumable or
nonconsumable.98 With respect to nonconsumables—things that
“may be enjoyed without alteration of [their] substance,”99—such as
land, houses, shares of stock, furniture, and vehicles,100 the
91. Id. art. 535.
92. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 111.
93. See id. § 1:31, at 83–84.
94. LA. CIV. CODE art. 577 (2014). For a detailed discussion on expenses, see
infra Part II.B.1.e.
95. Art. 890. The Civil Code defines a “usufruct” as a real right of limited
duration whose features vary with the type of thing to which it is subject. Id. art.
535. This feature is unlike full ownership, which lasts in perpetuity. See id. art. 477
cmt. b. A usufruct can terminate in a variety of ways: upon the death of the
usufructuary, at another time determined by law, or at a time stipulated by the
parties. Id. art. 607. The 890 usufruct is one such example of when the law
provides that a usufruct can terminate before the death of usufructuary: the article
provides that the usufruct will terminate either at the death or remarriage of the
spouse. Id. art. 890.
96. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 7:5, at 438.
97. See id. § 7:5, at 438–39.
98. The Louisiana Civil Code defines “consumable things” as “those that
cannot be used without being expended or consumed, or without their substance
being changed, such as money, harvested agricultural products, stocks of
merchandise, foodstuffs, and beverages.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 536 (2014). The
Louisiana Civil Code defines “nonconsumable things” as “those that may be
enjoyed without alteration of their substance, although their substance may be
diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by the use to which they are
applied, such as lands, houses, shares of stock, animals, furniture, and vehicles.”
Id. art. 537.
99. Id. art. 537.
100. Id.
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usufructuary is limited to the mere use and enjoyment of the
property—the usufructuary has no right to dispose of it.101
Additionally, the usufructuary is bound to care for things subject to
the usufruct as a “prudent administrator.”102
The usufructuary has different rights with respect to consumable
things.103 The Code defines “consumable things” as things that
cannot be used without being expended or consumed, such as
money.104 When a usufructuary holds a usufruct over a consumable
thing, the usufructuary becomes the owner of it.105 With this
ownership, the usufructuary has the right to dispose of the thing.106
The ownership requirement is necessary in this instance because a
consumable thing is, by its nature, disposed of through use.107 Upon
the termination of a usufruct of a consumable thing, the usufructuary
is obligated to either pay the naked owner the value the thing had at
the commencement of the usufruct or deliver to the naked owner
things of the same quantity or quality.108
B. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct
When the Legislature extended the spousal usufruct to the
blended family in intestacy, more problems were created than were
101. See id. art. 539.
102. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 4:18, at 291. This standard is delineated
from the comments to article 576. Comment (b) to article 576 provides, in
pertinent part:
The expressions “prudent owner” and “prudent administrator” in the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and the corresponding bon père de famille
in the French Civil Code, reflect the notion of homo diligens et studiosus
paterfamilias of the Roman law. Thus, the usufructuary is liable even for
slight fault, namely, he must exercise the diligence that an attentive and
careful man exercises in the management of his own affairs.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 576 cmt. b (2014). Other standards restrict the actions of the
usufructuary. One such standard is embodied in Civil Code article 558, which
includes the usufructuary’s restriction on the improvements he or she can make.
Additionally, under the Code, the usufructuary is allowed to lease and encumber
his or her right. Id. art. 567.
103. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 538 (2014).
104. Id. art. 536.
105. Louisiana Civil Code article 538 provides:
If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the usufructuary
becomes owner of them. He may consume, alienate, or encumber them
as he sees fit. At the termination of the usufruct he is bound either to pay
to the naked owner the value that the things had at the commencement of
the usufruct or to deliver to him things of the same quantity and quality.
Id. art. 538.
106. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 1:3, at 9.
107. See id. § 1:3, at 8.
108. Id.
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solved. Features of the 890 usufruct do little to cater to the
potential acrimonious relationships within the blended family and
additionally fail to promote either of the predominant succession
theories.
1. The Inadequacies vis-à-vis the Stepfamily
What follows is a delineation of the features of the usufruct that
render it a poor mechanism to be implemented in the context of
intestacy and the blended family. These include the nature of the
usufruct itself, the prudent administrator standard, the power of the
usufructuary to dispose of consumable things, the concept of
security, and the concept of expenses.
a. The Nature of the Usufruct: The Sharing of Attributes of
Ownership
As explained above, a usufruct is an example of a
dismemberment of full ownership whereby the usufructuary
receives the rights of use and enjoyment of the thing held in usufruct
and the naked owner retains the right to dispose of the thing.109
These separate rights of the usufructuary and naked owner are
shared over the same property contemporaneously.110 Thus, under
article 890, the surviving spouse receives the usufruct over the
decedent’s one-half share of community property, while the
decedent’s children receive naked ownership over the same share.111
Given the potential acrimony within blended families, forcing the
surviving spouse and the decedent’s children to concurrently
exercise their interests in the same property allows for the
exacerbation of any rancorous dynamics within the stepfamily that
predate the decedent’s death. Thus, the inherent sharing of interests
that underlies the nature of the usufruct may become the source for
more discord in a blended family.
b. The Prudent Administrator Standard
Additionally, the standard governing the usufructuary’s actions
vis-à-vis the property—the prudent administrator standard112—is
potentially another source of enmity. While the term “prudent
109. See supra Part II.A.2.
110. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 1:1, at 2–5.
111. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2014).
112. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 4:14, at 285–87 (discussing the
“usufructuary as prudent administrator”).
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administrator” is interpreted by various examples in the Civil Code,
the standard still remains fairly imprecise and does not provide
much guidance for what a usufructuary can and cannot do.113 This
vague standard has been clarified through jurisprudential examples,
defining the prudent administrator standard as requiring “the
diligence that an attentive and careful man commonly exercises in
the management of his own affairs”; however, even this definition is
disturbing because it provides no guidelines for the usufructuary and
its violation is determined by the courts as a question of fact.114 In
the absence of precise statutory contours, the interpretation of the
standard is susceptible to inconsistent and subjective judicial
interpretation.
This loose standard has unique and unnecessary repercussions
for the stepfamily and intestacy. For example, if Drizella holds a
usufruct over a nonconsumable, she can do anything to the
detriment of Cinderella, so long as she abides by this loose standard.
Contrarily, Drizella might take certain actions believing that she is
acting within the confines of the prudent administrator standard, just
to find out in later litigation that she was not. Given the difficulty in
determining what Drizella is permitted to do within the prudent
administrator standard, Drizella could be chilled in her use of the
property or could incur significant legal expenses in hiring an
attorney to counsel her with respect to her use of the assets. The
unclear definition lends itself to disagreement, which if escalated to
litigation, would result in significant costs to both the surviving
spouse and the children. Default intestacy provisions should not
provide a forum for additional disagreement between Drizella and
Cinderella.

113. One example of the prudent administrator standard is embodied in Civil
Code article 597, which provides: “The usufructuary who loses a predial servitude
by nonuse or who permits a servitude to be acquired on the property by
prescription is responsible to the naked owner.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 597 (2014).
Another example of the prudent administrator is embodied in Civil Code article
598, which provides:
If, during the existence of the usufruct, a third person encroaches on the
immovable property or violates in any other way the rights of the naked
owner, the usufructuary must inform the naked owner. When he fails to
do so, he shall be answerable for the damages that the naked owner may
suffer.
Id. art. 598.
114. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 4:14, at 286.
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c. The Power of the Usufructuary to Dispose of a Consumable
Thing
When the 890 usufruct is applied to a consumable thing,115 the
surviving spouse receives ownership over the consumable thing, and
upon termination, the surviving spouse has to either pay the value
that the thing had at the commencement of the usufruct to the
decedent’s children or deliver to them things of the same quantity or
quality.116
This setup could prove troublesome in the context of the
stepfamily and intestacy where a stepmother has no regard for the
decedent’s children’s eventual rights as naked owners. For example,
assume Drizella receives a usufruct over the decedent’s share of
cash or bank accounts formerly owned by the spouses as community
property, essentially assuming “ownership” over the funds. She can
do what she wants with the cash or bank accounts during the
usufruct; however, at the termination of the usufruct, she is required
to pay Cinderella, the naked owner, the value that the cash had at the
usufruct’s commencement.117 If the usufruct terminates by
Drizella’s remarriage, then she will be required to make an
accounting and repay Cinderella within the parameters set by the
Code.118 If, however, the usufruct terminates as a result of Drizella’s
death, the amount owed to Cinderella becomes an estate debt
enforceable against Drizella’s universal successors.119 Because the
usufruct of consumables affords the surviving spouse considerably
more freedom in disposing of the assets subject to the usufruct, the
potential for abuse is great. Drizella could dispose of valuable
consumable assets—including, for example, cash, jewelry, or other
personal items—and fail to reserve sufficient assets to account for
the value of the consumables at the usufruct’s termination. If all or a
significant portion of the decedent’s estate is made up of
consumable property, then it is quite possible for Drizella to use the
entirety of the estate for her own support and enjoyment and die
insolvent, thereby leaving Cinderella with no recourse. Given that so
few people report to have a good relationship with their
stepparents,120 this scenario could be significantly exacerbated in the
context of the stepfamily and intestacy.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See supra notes 104−108 and accompanying text.
See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 1:3, at 8.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 538 (2014).
See id.
See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 4:33, at 322–23.
See Richard, supra note 55.
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d. Security
The Legislature has enacted provisions that prevent the
surviving spouse from completely expending or damaging a thing
held in usufruct without recourse. Civil Code article 571 obligates
the usufructuary to give security to the naked owner in order to
ensure that the usufructuary abides by the prudent administrator
standard.121 Security also protects the children from the possibility
that the usufructuary will not have sufficient assets to account for
the value of consumable things disposed of during the usufruct.122
While the Code dispenses with the requirement of posting security
in certain family relationships,123 security is owed by a spouse with
an 890 usufruct when the naked owners are the surviving spouse’s
stepchildren.124 This is not surprising. Cognizant of the increased
potential for abuse or waste that is seen in the Cinderella Problem,
the Legislature required that security be posted to protect the
children.125
Unfortunately, this security may be inadequate. First, although
the Code requires that the security be in the amount of the “total
value of the property subject to the usufruct,” courts actually retain
significant discretion in determining an appropriate amount, though
the emphasis is on maintaining the protection of the naked owner.126
Specifically, the court “may increase or reduce the amount of the
security, upon proper showing, but the amount shall not be less than
the value of the movables subject to the usufruct.”127 Moreover, the
121. See Louisiana Civil Code article 571, which provides:
The usufructuary shall give security that he will use the property subject
to the usufruct as a prudent administrator and that he will faithfully fulfill
all the obligations imposed on him by law or by the act that established
the usufruct unless security is dispensed with. If security is required, the
court may order that it be provided in accordance with law.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 571 (2014).
122. See id.; see also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 4:7, at 266–69.
123. Another example of when security is dispensed with is under the parental
usufruct created in Louisiana Civil Code article 223.
124. LORIO, supra note 23, at § 2:16, at 57.
125. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1514 cmt. c (2014) (“The legislature made a policy
decision that children of a prior marriage and illegitimate children are entitled to
greater protection than are children of the marriage, or, in other words, to treat a
surviving spouse who is the parent of the naked owner different from a surviving
spouse who is not the parent of the naked owner.”).
126. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[t]he security shall be in the
amount of the total value of the property subject to the usufruct. The court may
increase or reduce the amount of the security, on proper showing, but the amount
shall not be less than the value of the movables subject to the usufruct.” Id. art.
572.
127. Id.
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Code does not specify what type of security is required, which
allows courts to infer that any type of security is permissible.128
Confirming this inference, the Legislature enacted a provision
describing the types of security that are permissible under the 890
usufruct:
If security is owed to the naked owner by the usufructuary
who is the surviving spouse, the court may order the
execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents as it
deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either
community or separate property, movable or immovable, as
security.129
This addition complicates the security requirement for a surviving
spouse with the curious reference to “notes” and “other
documents.”130 The Legislature has not explained what these
requirements mean, nor have the courts.
The ambiguities that result from “security” being poorly defined
may lead to more disagreement between Drizella and Cinderella. For
example, Drizella may simply sign an unsecured promissory note as
security, effectively promising to perform an obligation that she is
already legally bound to perform. Moreover, because “other
documents” is not defined in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, it could
be any type of document, and this may allow Drizella to post illusory
security. Hence, as it stands now, Drizella could abide by this statute
but substantively circumvent the security requirement, leaving
Cinderella without recourse. This potential for circumvention
undermines the policy behind the security requirement, which is to
hold Drizella accountable for her use and enjoyment when the naked
owners are not her children, subverting the sought-after balancing of
interests between Drizella and Cinderella.
e. Expenses
One final source of confusion and potential discord is the
Code’s requirement that the usufructuary pay various expenses of
the usufruct.131 The Code distinguishes between ordinary repairs
and extraordinary repairs, explaining that “[e]xtraordinary repairs
are those for the reconstruction of the whole or of a substantial part
128. See id.
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1202 (2008). This provision applies only when
the usufructuary is not the natural parent of the naked owners. See art. 1514.
130. § 9:1202.
131. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 581 (2014) (“The usufructuary is answerable for
all expenses that become necessary for the preservation and use of the property
after the commencement of the usufruct.”).

922

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

of the property subject to the usufruct. All others are ordinary
repairs.”132 The distinction between what is considered
extraordinary and what is considered ordinary, however, is not so
simply drawn in real life.133 The lack of clarity as to which
expenses the usufructuary and naked owner are obligated to pay
adds another level of uncertainty and discord in the context of the
stepfamily and intestacy. For example, without a clear definition of
what constitutes an “ordinary expense,” Drizella may refuse to pay
any expenses, arguing that all expenses of the property are
“extraordinary” and thus Cinderella’s responsibility. The only
mechanism that might end the bickering would be litigation, which
is expensive and requires a delay in the determination of certain
expenses, potentially allowing for the property to fall into
significant disrepair.134
2. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct vis-à-vis the Theories of
Succession
Given that the current intestacy scheme is inadequate in the
context of the stepfamily, a new, modernized approach to the
blended family in intestacy must be taken. However, to ameliorate
the present scheme, one must return to the beginning and reconsider
the theories underlying intestacy.
a. The Shortfalls of the 890 Usufruct Under the Natural Duty
Theory
The 890 usufruct is incompatible with the decedent’s natural
duty to both his or her children and the natural duty to his or her
132. Id. art. 578.
133. For an example of this difficulty in distinguishing between ordinary and
extraordinary repairs, see Succession of Crain, 450 So. 2d 1374 (La. Ct. App.
1984).
134. One Louisiana case, for example, shows the consequences of failing to
distinguish between what was classified as ordinary expenses and what was
classified as extraordinary expenses. In Succession of Crain, a stepmother held a
legal usufruct over a piece of property. Id. When the property fell into disrepair, a
dispute arose between the usufructuary stepmother and the naked-owner
stepchildren. Id. at 1375. The First Circuit held that ordinary repairs on the
property consisted of the reparation of leak spots, the removal of mold throughout
the house that resulted from water leaks, and the replacement of windows, among
others. Id. at 1376. Extraordinary repairs, which were the responsibility of the
naked owners, included the reparation of the dock, the boat slip, and the roof. Id.
The First Circuit did not articulate a standard in distinguishing between the
expenses but rather merely provided an arbitrary list of what was ordinary and
what was extraordinary. Id.

2014]

COMMENT

923

spouse.135 Louisiana must reevaluate the current 890 usufruct
scheme if the natural duty theory is a genuine goal of intestate
succession in Louisiana.
i. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Children
If the decedent’s natural duty is toward his or her children, the
890 usufruct only has the potential to conflict with the interests of
the children. While the decedent’s children would be granted the
interest of disposition, and thus would be able to sell the property, it
would be difficult to sell a property burdened with a usufruct.136 In
the case where a decedent is survived by a much younger spouse
who is closer in age to his or her children, the surviving spouse
could outlive the children, thus depriving them of various rights in
their parent’s community property.137
ii. The Natural Duty to the Surviving Spouse
The 890 usufruct in the context of the stepfamily also does not
comport with the decedent’s natural duty toward his or her surviving
spouse. Given that an elderly surviving spouse is normally not
economically self-sufficient,138 the usufruct does not ensure
Drizella’s economic stability because she is only able to sell her
rights under the usufruct, which are not as valuable as full
ownership.139 Additionally, ordinary expenses over a large piece of
property could be cost-prohibitive, and if Drizella has nothing other
than a usufruct over a home and even a small amount of cash, she
cannot be expected to tend to her duties as usufructuary and survive
day-to-day.

135. See supra Part I.A.1.
136. When selling a property burdened with a usufruct, one is selling only the
right to dispose of the property, not the right to use and enjoy the property, which
belongs to someone else. Thus, the sale of property subject to a usufruct is not as
valuable as the sale of property in full ownership.
137. The modern phenomenon of people living longer makes this scenario of a
decedent’s child dying before receiving full ownership even more probable. The
average life expectancy for women is 77.3 years, compared with only 71.2 for
men. TABLE 2: AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH BY STATE FOR 2000 AND
RATIO OF ESTIMATES, available at wonder.cdc.gov/WONDER/help/populations
/population-projections/MethodsTable2.xls.
138. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.b.
139. Alienation of property in full ownership is necessarily more valuable than
the alienation of a usufruct over that same property because with full ownership,
there exists no dismemberment of ownership.
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b. The Shortfalls of the Presumed Will Theory
If the presumed will theory is a viable goal in Louisiana
succession law, then the 890 usufruct fails the stepfamily in this
regard as well.140 No parent desires complex stepfamily dynamics to
be under even more strain after his or her death. Also, the evolution
that took place in the spousal usufruct over the centuries shows that
spouses want their surviving spouses to be well taken care of.141
Although the Louisiana Legislature took steps toward improving the
position of the surviving spouse in intestacy, more should be done to
protect the interests of both Drizella and Cinderella. Louisiana’s
current intestacy scheme for the stepfamily is clearly broken, and its
remedy requires us to look elsewhere for inspiration.
III. OTHER APPROACHES TO THE CINDERELLA PROBLEM
Parts I and II of this Comment explored the theories underlying
succession law and the phenomenon of the blended family and
subsequently illustrated the deficiencies of Louisiana law in the face
of these two concepts. Given the shortfalls of Louisiana’s approach
to the Cinderella Problem, it is necessary to look to other
jurisdictions for guidance. With increased divorce rates around the
world,142 the complications stemming from the blended family in
intestacy exist everywhere.143 Similarly, the improvement in the
position of the surviving spouse in intestacy was not just limited to
Louisiana, and varying approaches to the Cinderella Problem
exist.144 With some more successful at ensuring the balancing of
140. See supra Part I.A.2.
141. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
142. See Mark Dummett, Not So Happily Ever After as Indian Divorce Rate
Doubles, BBC NEWS, S. ASIA (Dec. 31, 2010, 6:31 PM), http://www.bbc
.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12094360 [http://perma.cc/4HRF-MGHE] (archived
Mar. 4, 2014) (explaining the Indian divorce rate has increased by 100% in five
years); Divorce Rate: How Well Do You Know International Divorce Rates?,
HUFF POST DIVORCE (June 1, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/06/01/divorce-rate-how-well-do-_n_1562900.html#slide=1043117
[http://perma.cc/DA9P-M94U] (archived Mar. 4, 2014) (explaining that in 2010,
the United Kingdom’s divorce rate rose for the first time in a decade; the Chinese
government, in efforts to combat the rising divorce rate, instituted a program for
adults to write love letters upon their marriage to be delivered seven years later;
the Japanese divorce rate doubled “and then some” between 1985 and 2000;
Russia has the highest divorce rate in the world).
143. See KARL HEINZ NEUMAYER, ET AL., INTESTATE SUCCESSION, in 5
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 104–61 (2007)
(demonstrating the varying approaches to the surviving spouse in intestate
succession in jurisdictions across the world).
144. See id.
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interests between the stepparent and children than others, a
discussion of several approaches and their respective merits is
helpful in assembling Louisiana’s solution for Drizella and
Cinderella.
A. The Civilian Approach: What Has France Done?
Considering intestacy to be the fundamental method of
inheritance, the redactors of the French Civil Code placed great
importance on intestacy provisions and considered “testamentary
inheritance somewhat of a gloss” on intestate inheritance.145 French
academics note that intestate succession is itself testamentary in spirit,
following the decedent’s presumed will whenever possible.146
Historically, the “conjoint survivant,” or the surviving spouse,
was not at the top of the list when it came to inheritance.147 Placing
the rights of the surviving spouse barely before the rights of the
State,148 the Code Napoléon originally positioned the surviving
spouse behind all other relatives capable of inheriting.149 With the
rationale that the surviving spouse was not a blood relative of the
deceased, the French Civil Code continued the deeply rooted
historical objective of keeping a decedent’s patrimony within his or
her bloodline to ensure the growth and development of the estate.150
The distribution therefore favored the distribution of the estate to
those with interests resulting from “lignage” rather than those
resulting from “marriage.”151
The low position of the surviving spouse in the context of
intestate succession was considered by academics as insufficient.152
Until a recent revision of the intestacy provisions, the surviving
spouse was considered the “parent pauvre,” or the “poor parent,” as a
result of the surviving spouse’s unfavorable position.153 Nevertheless,
145. HENRY DYSON, FRENCH PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE
AND PRACTICE 273 (2003).
146. See AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 588,
TRANSLATIONS 2 (Carlos E. Lazarus trans., 6th ed. 1971).

LAW: PRINCIPLES
in 4 CIVIL LAW

147. See id. § 604.
148. See id.
149. See Lorio, supra note 11, at 1179. The surviving spouse was behind any
relative up to the 12th degree for inheritance. See DYSON, supra note 145, at 274.
150. See Le Conjoint Successible, COMITÉ DÉPARTEMENTAL D’INFORMATION
ET D’ACTION EN FAVEUR DES PERSONNES AGÉES 5 (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www
.ciapa.com/LE_CIAPA/Dossier_Cptes_Rendus/080417_Le_conjoint_successible
.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MTG-MR4N] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
151. See id.
152. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 146, § 588.
153. DOMINIQUE DE LEGGE & JACQUES MÉZARD, LA LOI SUR LES DROITS DU
CONJOINT SURVIVANT : UNE LOI ÉQUILIBRÉE, À L'EFFICACITÉ RECONNUE 7 (2011),
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similar to Louisiana, the surviving spouse’s position in France
improved when 19th century lawmakers gave surviving spouses the
right to receive a usufruct over one-third of the decedent’s property
when he or she died intestate.154
Though the surviving spouse’s position progressively improved
over the 20th century, the improvement was not enough.155 With the
increase in diversity of family composition, namely the stepfamily,
the French intestacy legislation became out of sync with the construct
of French families.156 Also, the undesirable position of the surviving
spouse was exacerbated by the French population’s increasing life
expectancy.157 On the need for repositioning the surviving spouse in
response to these sociological and economic changes, one French
politician declared:
The surviving spouse is no longer considered a stranger that
the family must defend against, but rather a co-founder of the
family. The marriage is no longer considered as an institution
with the goal of continuing on the family wealth, but rather as
the consecration of two wills for emotional reasons rather than
economic.158
These sociological and economic evolutions contributed to the
need to recalibrate the relationship between the surviving spouse and
the decedent’s children in the context of intestacy.159 In 2001, the
French Legislature responded to the sociological and economic
changes and elevated the surviving spouse’s position by enacting
French Civil Code article 757. The article provides:
Where a predeceased spouse leaves children or descendants,
the surviving spouse shall take, at his or her option, either the
usufruct of the whole of the existing property or the
ownership of the quarter where all the children are born from
both spouses and the ownership of the quarter in the presence
of one or several children who are not born from both
spouses.160

http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-476/r10-476_mono.html [http://perma.cc/T3FU-GKJ7]
(archived Mar. 4, 2014).
154. See Le Conjoint Successible, supra note 150.
155. See DE LEGGE & MÉZARD, supra note 153.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See DYSON, supra note 145, at 274.
160. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 757 (Fr.).
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The provision directly addresses the Cinderella Problem. It
provides that if the decedent’s children are not also the surviving
spouse’s children, then the spouse does not have the option to take
the usufruct but instead must take one-fourth ownership of the
decedent’s property. Thus, there is no opportunity for the surviving
spouse to hold a usufruct with the decedent’s children as naked
owners.161 Giving the surviving spouse no option other than onefourth ownership, the French Legislature reasoned that this rule is to
prevent a surviving spouse from “paralyzing” the interests of the
parties.162
Given the comparable societal changes in Louisiana, Professor
Kathryn V. Lorio has advocated that Louisiana should look to its
“precursor,” France, for help in fashioning a response to the
changing societal values regarding stepfamilies.163 Though not
recommending that Louisiana follow France “blindly,” Professor
Lorio suggests that adopting a similar scheme may be
appropriate.164
Adopting the one-fourth fractional approach taken by the
French, rather than the usufruct, however, would not best comport
with either the natural duty or presumed will theories—both of
which should inform legislation affecting intestate succession.165
First, the French fractional approach does not align with the
presumed will of the American decedent because most modern
studies and surveys show that Americans would like their estates to
completely devolve to their surviving spouses, even when children
also survive them.166 Adopting the French approach would reverse
Louisiana’s trend of honoring the presumed will of the decedent,
evidenced by its expansion of the spousal usufruct over the
centuries.167 Further, the fractional approach does not best comport
with the natural duty theory because the provision does not
adequately provide for the decedent’s natural duty to ensure his or
her surviving spouse’s economic welfare in the case of a small
estate.168
161. See DYSON, supra note 145, at 275.
162. Id.
163. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1180.
164. Id.
165. See generally discussion supra Part I.A.
166. One example of these studies is the “Dunham study.” The Dunham study
reviewed 22 estates with decedents survived by a spouse plus children and 6
estates in which the decedent was survived only by a spouse. Fisher & Curnutte,
supra note 15, at 74. Out of the 28 estates, 27 of the decedents left 100% of their
estates to their surviving spouses, and all of the decedents with children left their
entire estates to their surviving spouses. Id.
167. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
168. See generally discussion infra Part IV.
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B. The United States
With most people dying intestate, there is no area of American
private law that concerns the public interest more than intestate
succession.169 Each state approaches the problem of intestacy
differently. Significantly, several states have done away with
common law schemes that grant the surviving spouse a mere
interest in the decedent’s estate, which are analogous to the
usufruct and known as “dower.”170 In its place, these states have
implemented provisions modeled after the Uniform Probate
Code.171
1. The Original Uniform Probate Code
The Original Uniform Probate Code (Original UPC) was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (the Commission) in the 1960s.172 Today, 15
states have implemented the Original UPC or portions of it.173 The
Commission drafted statutes that comported with the presumed will
theory.174 The drafters wanted a code that would “provide suitable
rules and procedures for the person of modest means who relies on
the estate plan provided by law.”175 Under the Original UPC, when a
decedent died intestate leaving “surviving [children] one or more of
whom are not [children] of the surviving spouse,” then the surviving
spouse was entitled to one-half of the intestate estate.176 This

169. Lomenzo, supra note 24, at 941.
170. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
171. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.06.005 (Westlaw 2014); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102 (Westlaw 2014). Both Alaska and Colorado abolished
dower and adopted legislation modeled after the UPC.
172. Fellows et al., supra note 20, at 323. For a detailed history of the UPC,
see Averill & Brantley, supra note 9, at 635.
173. Sharla K. Raab, A Comparative Analysis Between the Uniform Probate
Code and Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code, 79 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 593, 595 (2002).
174. Spitko, supra note 41, at 1070. See also Waggoner, supra note 28, at 71
(theorizing that the “predominant consideration” behind intestacy provisions is the
decedent’s intent).
175. Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and
Related Matters, 55 ALB. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (quoting UPC art. II, pt. 1 gen.
cmt. (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The drafters looked to trends in
the desires of people dying testate as expressed in the wills they created to
determine how an intestate decedent would want property distributed upon death.
Id.
176. UPC § 2-102 (1969).
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fractional distribution between the spouse and the decedent’s
children was known as the “straight-fractional-share approach.”177
Academics have argued that despite the Commission’s efforts,
this uniform law has in actuality failed to comport with the
presumed will theory.178 Indeed, Professor Lawrence Waggoner,
Director of Research and Chief Reporter for the UPC, conceded that
the Original UPC’s straight-fractional-share approach was flawed.179
Its primary deficiency was that it sacrificed “the surviving spouse’s
economic security in the smaller to modest estates in order to
preserve inheritance expectations of adult children who, unlike the
surviving spouse, are in the labor market and not forced to rely for
subsistence on capital-generated income.”180 For example, if the
decedent’s estate totaled $50,000, then the surviving spouse would
only inherit $25,000 under the straight-fractional-share approach,
which may be an insufficient amount to ensure his or her continued
economic stability.
2. The Revised Uniform Probate Code
Promulgated in 1990, the Revised Uniform Probate Code
(Revised UPC) attempted to ameliorate the problems resulting from
the Original UPC and reform the Original UPC in light of data
showing the high numbers of people dying intestate.181 In addition,
the Commission also considered the multi-marriage phenomenon in
American society in which many American families have both
biological children and stepchildren.182 Incorporating these facts and
circumstances, the Revised UPC reflects an effort to achieve
fairness in the distribution of assets when a decedent dies
intestate.183
By enacting what is known as a “lump-sum-plus-a-fraction
approach,” the Commission was able to account for societal changes
and further underlying theories and goals. In addressing the
Cinderella Problem, section 2-102(4) of the Revised UPC provides
that the surviving spouse will receive “[t]he first $100,000, plus onehalf of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
at 63.
182.
183.

Waggoner, supra note 28, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Engel, supra note 15, at 351. See also Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 15,
Engel, supra note 15, at 351.
Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 15, at 63.
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decedent’s surviving descendants are not [children] of the surviving
spouse.”184
This lump-sum-plus-a-fractional approach better serves the
stepfamily dilemma of balancing the interests of the surviving
spouse and the stepchildren.185 Academics argue that the fractional
pattern of distribution only provides the surviving spouse with
“enough capital to generate an adequate stream of income” when the
184. Revised UPC § 2-102 provides:
The intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(A) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(B) all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of
the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving
spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of the intestate
estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but a
parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate
estate, if all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants
of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more
surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(4) The first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate
estate, if one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not
lineal descendants of the surviving spouse.
The Revised UPC also includes a separate provision for community property
states: section 2-102(A). Revised UPC § 2-102(A) provides:
(a) The intestate share of a surviving spouse in separate property is:
1. The entire estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of
the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving
spouse who survives the decedent;
2. The first $200,000, plus three-fourths of any balance of the intestate
estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent, but a
parent of the decedent survives the decedent.
3. The first $150,000, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate,
if all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving
descendants who are not descendants of the decedent.
4. The first $100,000, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate,
if one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not
descendants of the surviving spouse.
(b) The one-half of community property belonging to the decedent passes
to the surviving spouse as the intestate share.
The model statute provides that the decedent’s one-half share of the community
property will pass to the surviving spouse; however, most community property
states have not enacted this provision. The community property states that have
enacted the Revised UPC, for example Alaska, have enacted the regular version
section 2-102 of the Revised UPC rather than the specific community property
provision. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.102 (Westlaw 2014).
185. See Waggoner, supra note 28, at 39.
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estate contains significant assets.186 For example, under the original
UPC, in an intestate estate totaling $30,000, a fractional one-half
share allots the surviving spouse only $15,000.187 By comparison,
under the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach, the surviving spouse
would receive the full amount of the estate.188
This approach corresponds with the wealth of the estate in the
blended family make-up.189 In the quintessential estate—one of
modest value—this approach would strengthen the position of the
surviving spouse by giving the surviving spouse all of the assets.190
Academics opine that in small estates, it is more important to ensure
the economic security of the surviving spouse than it is to “satisfy[]
the inheritance expectations of the decedent’s adult children.”191
This conclusion reflects a careful balancing of interests under the
natural duty approach. This provision would also work in larger
estates because a decedent would likely feel that giving some of his
or her estate to his or her children would not drastically affect or
reduce the surviving spouse’s economic security.192 Thus, the lumpsum-plus-a-fraction approach better comports with the presumed
will theory, ensuring the economic stability and comfort of Drizella
as best the decedent’s estate can.
3. The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in the United
States
Both the Original UPC and Revised UPC have had a major
influence on the intestacy policies adopted by states.193 Prior to the
adoption of some version of the UPC, many states included the
concept of dower in their intestacy provisions.194 “Dower” is an
ancient common law concept dating back to the Middle Ages with
principles paralleling that of a usufruct.195 Defined as “a life estate in
186. Id. at 34.
187. Id.
188. See UPC § 2-102(4) (2006).
189. Waggoner, supra note 28, at 34.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 39.
192. Id.
193. See infra notes 204–210 and accompanying text.
194. See for example, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.06.005 (Westlaw 2014),
which adopted the UPC and abolished dower.
195. The origins of dower are so ancient that neither Coke nor Blackstone were
able to trace it. It was recognized in the Magna Carta in 1215, and Lord Bacon was
heard to speak in mid-17th century of “life, liberty and dower.” Barbara Ann
Kulzer, Property and the Family: Spousal Protection, 4 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 195,
199 n.21 (1973) (quoting Skovborg v. Smith, 9 N.J. Super. 389, 74 A.2d 910 (Ch.
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one-third of all lands in which her deceased husband was seized of an
estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage,” 196 dower began
as a wedding gift and ultimately ripened into a right.197 The principles
embodied in dower are similar to those of a usufruct in two
fundamental ways: (1) both schemes grant the surviving spouse an
interest rather than full, outright ownership and (2) this interest
terminates upon the death of the wife or, in the case of the usufruct,
upon the death of the usufructuary.198
In the United States, dower was once very common in most
states’ intestacy provisions;199 however, in the modern era it has been
abolished in nearly all states.200 The abolition of dower demonstrates
an effort to move toward more modern regimes201 that give the
surviving spouse an outright ownership interest in the estate.202
Among the states that have abolished dower and implemented the
Revised UPC are Alaska,203 Colorado,204 Michigan,205 Montana,206
Div. 1950)). For a more detailed history and evolution of dower, see Skovborg, 74
A.2d at 911.
196. William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1037, 1045 (1966). See also GLENDON, supra note 33, at 283 (defining
“dower” as “a fixed property interest which attaches upon marriage to the real
property of the husband in favor of the wife. In many state dower laws have now
been made applicable to both husband and wife. The wife becomes entitled to lifetime possessory rights only if she survives her husband and vice versa.”).
197. Kulzer, supra note 195, at 198.
198. See discussion supra Part II.A.
199. Dower, a common law concept, only took root in common law states. It
did not take root in community property states, which implemented forms of
Spanish and French law for spousal protection. Kulzer, supra note 195, at 196–97.
200. States where dower has not been abolished include Arkansas, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-11-301 (Westlaw 2014), Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.020
(Westlaw 2014), and Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.02 (Westlaw 2014).
201. Christopher A. Richardson, Dower—An Old Law with New Headaches,
NAT’L L. REV., Jul. 27, 2012, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/dower-oldlaw-new-headaches [http://perma.cc/5F9L-ASBV] (archived Mar. 4, 2014).
202. Windsor D. Calkins & C. Montee Kennedy, Protection of the Surviving
Spouse: The Demise of Dower and Curtesy and the New Oregon Probate Code, 6
WILLIAMETTE L.J. 449, 449 (1970). See also Kulzer, supra note 195, at 196
(explaining many states have abolished dower and substituted the forced or
indefeasible share).
203. Alaska has abolished dower and adopted the Revised UPC. See ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 13.06.005 (Westlaw 2014).
204. Colorado has abolished dower, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-112
(Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, see id. § 15-11-102.
205. Michigan has abolished dower in community property, see MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.214 (Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC,
see id. § 700.2102.
206. Montana has abolished dower, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-122
(Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, see id. § 72-2-112.
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and North Dakota.207 Some states have abolished dower and
implemented the Original UPC,208 and several other states have
abolished dower and implemented provisions roughly based on the
Original UPC.209 This retreat from dower can be attributed to the
complications that it brings. These complications include: the
inalienability of the property that is burdened with this right and the
practical ineffectiveness of the regime when the deceased owns little
or no property210—the same problems experienced by usufructuaries
and naked owners in Louisiana.211
Ultimately, the concept of splitting ownership between members
of a stepfamily under article 890 should be abolished. Instead, the
surviving spouse should get a certain portion of the estate in full
ownership. Full ownership would ensure the surviving spouse is
better provided for because the surviving spouse has a full ownership
interest, rather than sharing partial ownership with the stepchildren.
The abolition of dower in the United States in favor of a full
ownership interest demonstrates the evolution of the surviving
spouse’s position in the context of intestacy, and it is a model that
should be followed in Louisiana by transforming the usufruct interest
into a full ownership interest. The natural duty theory in favor of the
surviving spouse is carried out with this granting of full ownership
because the surviving spouse is able to sell or do as he or she wants
with the given property. The goals behind the presumed will theory
are furthered because the decedent usually desires the entire estate to
devolve to the surviving spouse upon death. Thus following with the
trend of other states, Louisiana should provide a full ownership
interest to Drizella.
IV. SOLUTION: ADOPTING THE LUMP-SUM-PLUS-A-FRACTION
APPROACH
The evolution of the spousal usufruct in Louisiana was a result
of the heightened value that Louisiana began to place on ensuring
207. North Dakota has abolished dower, see N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-0709 (Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, see id. § 30.1-04-02.
208. Some of these states include Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-914 (Westlaw
2014), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-113 (Westlaw 2014), Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-104 (Westlaw 2014), and New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 560:3 (Westlaw 2014).
209. Some of these states include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 43-8-57 (Westlaw
2014), Florida, FLA. STAT. § 732.111 (Westlaw 2014), Maryland, MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS, § 3-202 (Westlaw 2014), and Missouri, MO. REV. STAT.
§ 474.110 (Westlaw 2014).
210. GLENDON, supra note 33, at 283.
211. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.

934

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

the economic security of the surviving spouse upon the death of the
spouse.212 Over time, this spousal usufruct was extended to
stepparents, demonstrating again the increased value placed on the
surviving spouse.213 These legislative changes demonstrate a
material shift in the way that Louisiana views intestate succession,
culminating in an emphasis on maintenance of the surviving
spouse.214 In response to these societal changes, Louisiana must
further improve the provisions governing the blended family in
intestate succession. The optimal approach would be for Louisiana
to follow the model of the Revised UPC’s lump-sum-plus-a-fraction
approach and give the surviving spouse the right to receive the first
$100,000 of the estate plus one-half of the remaining share of the
estate.215
Thus, for example, assume Cinderella’s father and Drizella had
accumulated $500,000 during their marriage. When her husband
dies, Drizella would receive the first $100,000 plus half of the
remaining community property: $200,000. Accordingly, Cinderella
would receive the remaining $200,000 of the estate plus all of her
father’s separate property.216 This approach better comports with
both the natural duty and presumed will theories. First, this solution
comports with the natural duty theory because the surviving spouse
is better provided for than with the current 890 usufruct. Receiving
outright ownership, the surviving spouse is not required to share
interests in property with the decedent’s children. The potential for
any discord associated with this sharing—payment of expenses and
maintenance—is thus eliminated. Secondly, the presumed will
theory is furthered because the surviving spouse receives portions of
the decedent’s property in full ownership, rather than a mere
interest. Further, given that most decedents want their surviving
spouses to receive their property upon their death, the presumed will
212. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
213. See discussion supra Part II.A.
214. See generally discussion supra Part I.A. At the same time, the forced
heirship doctrine was greatly reduced. Today, forced heirship is only applicable to
children 23 years and under and incapable adults. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2014).
For more on the history of forced heirship in Louisiana, see generally LORIO,
supra note 23, § 10:1–10.3, at 295–314.
215. Of course, if the decedent were to die survived by forced heirs in addition
to the surviving spouse, the right of the forced heirs to the legitime would take
precedence over the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse. In such a case, the
share of the surviving spouse would be reduced to the extent necessary to satisfy
the forced portion of the estate. This solution does not advocate overriding the
principles of forced heirship. In the rare event forced heirs are present, their rights
would take priority over those of the surviving spouse.
216. Under Louisiana law, upon a decedent’s intestate death, his or her
children receive all of the decedent’s separate property. See LORIO, supra note 23.
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theory is also better served under this example than under the
current intestacy scheme.217
Though granting full ownership rather than a mere interest in the
decedent’s community property is a significant change from the
current approach, states across the country have taken this route over
the last few decades by abolishing dower in favor of full ownership,
thus proving that it would not be difficult for Louisiana to adopt a
similar system. Louisiana should not be reluctant to adopt a noncivilian scheme given that France successfully adopted an approach
advocating for full ownership rather than a usufruct.218 Following in
the footsteps of other states that have abolished dower in favor of a
full ownership interest and also following in the footsteps of France,
Louisiana should eliminate the usufruct interest and instead replace
it with a full ownership interest in the first $100,000 and one-half of
the remaining community property. In light of the evolution of the
family that has taken place over the centuries, Louisiana should
adopt the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach so the stepmother can
live happily ever after too.
CONCLUSION
Given the modern prevalence of remarriage and the high rate of
people dying without wills, Louisiana must do more for Drizella and
Cinderella in intestacy than the 890 usufruct currently allows.
Increasing the opportunity for conflict and the likelihood of
litigation, the 890 usufruct is inherently unworkable in the context of
the stepfamily and intestacy. Looking to France and other states,
Louisiana has an opportunity to learn from the approaches of other
jurisdictions. Allowing for full ownership over a portion, rather than
a mere interest in the decedent’s share of the community property,
the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach would decrease the
problems currently faced by stepfamilies in intestacy. Implementing
this approach in Louisiana would ensure that Cinderella and Drizella
can both live happily ever after.
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